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Chapter 6
Risk Transfer in Public Pension Plans
Jeremy Gold
Public pension plans, as the term is used in the United States, are defined
benefit (DB) plans established by governments and their agencies to provide
retirement benefits to their former employees. In these systems, retirement
promises are made to employees in lieu of current wages. It is an economic
truth that the wages given up are exchanged for the liabilities (promises) of
defined benefit plans, and not for the plan assets. This is very different from
the defined contribution (DC) plan case where it is reasonable to equate
wages to plan contributions and thus plan assets. This economic distinction,
generally reinforced at law as well, has not been well communicated to
employees and has been particularly poorly communicated to employees
subject to wage and benefit negotiations.
In the private sector, the primary economic purpose of pension plan con-
tributions and plan assets is to secure (collateralize) the promised benefits
made to the plan participants and beneficiaries. In the governmental sec-
tor, this primacy of purpose may be surpassed by a budgeting goal designed
to minimize intergenerational wealth transfers.1 In neither situation, how-
ever, is it reasonable to believe that the assets of the plan represent deferred
wages. Plan liabilities have been exchanged for wages, but plan assets have
not. The financial validity of this assertion lies in the observation that the
taxpayers bear the risk of asset underperformance.
Whether the primary purpose is collateral or budgeting, annual actuarial
valuations of public defined benefit pension plans are performed in order
to determine plan liabilities, costs, and cash contributions. The incidence
of cash contributions establishes the taxpayers’ budget plan and the accu-
mulation of the contributions is intended to build asset levels sufficient to
provide benefit collateral. The actuarial methods and assumptions used are
designed so that each generation bears its fair share of multigenerational
costs. The actuarial process is intended to allocate risks fairly across gener-
ations as well. There is no intention to transfer costs, wealth, and/or risks
systematically between generations.
The author acknowledges helpful comments and suggestions from Lawrence N. Bader,
Francis Bernardi, Zvi Bodie, Jonathan F. Gold, Nick Hudson, Robert C. North, Ralfe, John
and the editors. Opinions remain those of the authors.
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This chapter demonstrates that, while actuarial processes may appear
intergenerationally fair on an expected basis, they systematically transfer
risk away from early generations and toward later generations. The result is
that equal expected costs imply unequal risk-adjusted_costs, whenever risky assets
are included in DB plans. This inherent bias favors current taxpayers, plan
participants, and politicians, at the expense of future taxpayers.
We begin with an abstract example of an investment opportunity that
illustrates the essential actuarial valuation flaw. The example, drawn from
Bader (2001), illustrates how a clever politician may attempt to take advant-
age of this flaw. The politician is later challenged by a well-educated member
of a generation that will be injured by the combination of actuarial error
and risky investment. Next we show that such risk transfers can lead to sub-
optimal decisions (all of which burden future taxpayers), including: poor
trade-offs of pension benefits for current wages in labor negotiations, skim
funds, and pension obligation bonds (POBs). Lastly, we note that the sub-
optimal decisions flow from the actuarial anticipation of risky returns and
not from the risky investments per se. Financial economics shows us how to
amend the actuarial process to avoid intergenerational risk transfer.
An Investment Opportunity
In this section we step through an abstract investment opportunity to illus-
trate how actuarial anticipation of expected returns systematically transfers
future returns to the first generation and foists risk upon subsequent gen-
erations. We later use the intuition from the abstract example in a more
formal, more practical, model.
Figures 6-1(a-b) show the simulated results of an investment strategy over
10 and 30 years, respectively. Each payoff point represents one trial. The
trials, which occurred randomly, are shown in rank order. The mean payoff
after 10 years is 1.03; the median is 0.77. There are twenty-two negative
outcomes (worst = −0.74) and seventy-eight positive (best = 5.43). The
corresponding 30-year statistics are 13.34, 7.85, 9 (−2.25), and 91 (64.12).
Because the mean and median are positive and because the number of
trials with negative values is few, these payoffs appear to be valuable. Suppose
that we were to offer this strategy in exchange for a certain payment today:
what price might we receive? If, for example, the risk-free 30-year zero-
coupon bond is priced at $0.23 per dollar of maturity value, might we be
able to sell the random payoffs for as much as $0.90---that is, at about half of
the present riskless value of the median payoff, well below one-third of the
riskless price for the mean payoff?2 What price might such a contract have
in the existing capital markets?
A Bader Swap
Each of the 100 outcomes in each figure represents the end of a path. Let us
look at the paths that underlie the 30-year case (Figure 6-2). The 100 equity
paths represent the random results from a $1 investment using a lognormal
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Figure 6-1. Investment payoffs over 100 random trials (ordered): (a) 10-year horizon,
(b) 30-year horizon. (Source: Author’s calculations.)
distribution with an expected annual return of 10 percent and an annual
standard deviation of 16 percent. The mean and median paths are shown
for the equity trials. The Treasuries earn 5 percent annually starting with a
$1 investment.
How do these paths relate to the outcomes in Figure 6-1(b)? Each of
those outcomes represents the result of an equity investment offset by a
short position in Treasuries, a net cost of $0 today. From each of the equity
endpoints in Figure 6-2, I have subtracted the endpoint of the Treasury
path to get the corresponding payoff point for Figure 6-1(b). The Treasury
path always ends with $4.32. The best equity path ends with $68.44 and thus
the best payoff point shown in Figure 6-1(b) is $64.12. Notice that some of
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Figure 6-2. Investment payoff paths for equities versus treasuries: 30 year horizon.
(Source: Author’s calculations.)
the equity paths end up below the Treasury endpoint. These represent the
nine negative payoffs. In particular, the worst case equity outcome is $2.07
leading to a payoff of minus $2.25. In other words the results in Figures 6-1(a-
b) simulate a long S&P-like investment short a zero-coupon Treasury bond.
What, then, should any market participant be willing to pay today for the
outcome opportunities? Exactly nothing.
Can one really buy these outcome distributions for $0? For a funded pen-
sion plan, the simple answer is: Yes. Bader (2001) illustrates how pension
plans could develop such distributions without cost. Starting with a plan
whose sole obligation might be $4.32 due in 30 years and a Treasury asset
of $1 that will exactly meet that future obligation, Bader’s plan sells the
Treasury bond and buys a diversified equity portfolio, each with a $1 cur-
rent price.3 Bader indicates that this is equivalent to a swap contract, so I
have labeled Figures 6-1(a-b) ‘‘Bader Swaps.’’ Bader Swaps are worthless at
inception but may have high expected future values. Algebraically:
P (t = 0) = 0
EP (t = 10) = 1.03
EP (t = 30) = 13.34
where P is value (price) and EP is expected future value.4
Consider a municipal pension plan with the same starting position as
the Bader plan. How will an actuary value that plan’s liabilities, assets, and
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current surplus or deficit? When establishing economic assumptions, pen-
sion actuaries are subject to Actuarial Standard of Practice 27. This specifies
that the actuary will estimate the expected return on assets and use that to
discount the liabilities. Thus, using the initial plan asset allocation, the actu-
ary will assume a 5-percent return and discount the future $4.32 obligation
to $1 today. This will match the plan’s asset value and the actuary will report
no surplus or deficit.
A hypothetical mayor may see an opportunity to improve the situation,
by directing the plan’s asset manager to sell the Treasury bond and buy the
S&P index. Now our actuary estimates that the plan will earn 10 percent
annually, and thus he revalues the liability at $0.25. The plan has a surplus
of $0.75. In effect, the Mayor has revalued the Bader Swap in accordance
with ASOP 27, such that P (t = 0) = 0.75. The Mayor takes the plan surplus
and cuts today’s taxes by $0.75, and the pension plan lock box holds all the
money ($0.25) that is actuarially necessary.
What is wrong with this approach? The plan is actuarially sufficient and
the taxpayers save money. The problem is that ASOP 27 has no prescrip-
tion for accounting for risk. Pension actuaries consider themselves fiscally
conservative, and individual actuaries might trim the expected return to a
‘‘conservative’’ 9 percent in this situation. An actuary who expected equities
to return 10 percent and, nonetheless, assumed a 5 percent return for the
all-equity plan, would be out of compliance with accepted actuarial stand-
ards. We shall see that the use of any assumption exceeding 5-percent in
this instance results in an unintended risk-based transfer of wealth between
generations. This is disturbing, because the use of a 5 percent assumption
is intergenerationally fair, financially sound, and actuarially unacceptable.
When the 10 percent assumption is used, who wins? The Mayor, the tax-
payers, and the actuary. Does anyone have to lose? The capital markets
tell us that the Bader Swap is worthless; the Mayor and the actuary say it
is worth $0.75. If it is really worth $0.75, then they should surely be able
to get someone to pay $0.60 for it. Would any creditworthy market parti-
cipant accept the pension plan obligation, the $1 in plan assets and pay
the taxpayers $0.60 for the privilege? The answer is no, because the cred-
itworthy market participant could short $1 in Treasuries and buy $1 of the
S&P, and pay no one for the privilege. He would be taking a substantial risk
by doing so. Financial economics explains that the expected future value on
the Bader Swap is exactly the market compensation for taking that risk. If
someone did take that risk, he would demand full compensation and have
nothing to share with the taxpayers.
The Mayor Meets a Financially Astute Taxpayer
This intuition may be formalized with a model that illustrates how the
risk may be measured and who bears it. Our model compares the
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fortunes of successive generations of taxpayers in order to detect system-
atic risk/wealth transfers among them. The generations are identified as
Gen1, Gen2, … Gen(n), … GenN, and each has the same number of mem-
bers, M. When the model begins, in Period 1, Gen1 is actively working and
paying taxes. Gen2 is attending school. A number, G, of each generation’s
M members spend their work time as employees of the local government. In
Period 2, Gen1 members are no longer working nor are they paying taxes,
Gen2 members are working taxpayers and Gen3 members are in school. In
Period 3, Gen1 is deceased, Gen2 is retired, Gen3 is working and Gen4 is
in school.
As the system commences, Gen1 designs a public pension plan that will
make a Period 2 payment of $M/G to each of the G former governmental
employees of Gen1. The plan continues period by period without amend-
ment. The $M/G payment to each of G recipients translates to $1 from each
of $M taxpayers. But which taxpayer will pay how much and when? Some
members of Gen1 suggest a PAYGO plan, saying ‘‘Let Gen2 members each
pay $1 next period.’’ Under the PAYGO plan, each Gen(n > 1) taxpayer will
pay $1 to the retirees of Gen(n−1).
Gen2 members disagree, ‘‘The services provided by Gen1’s public workers
go to Gen1. Gen1 must set aside enough money to fund the plan fully.’’
How much shall each Gen1 taxpayer contribute to the plan to prefund the
pension benefit? The present value of $1 due one period from now is:
PV = 1
1+ r
where r is the rate of return. Following the principles of ASOP 27, actuaries
assume that r is the expected rate of return on the money in the plan. For
convenience, we modify the 5 percent Treasuries and 10 percent equities
that were used above. Let the return on Treasuries be 5.2632 percent and
let the expected return on equities be 9.8901 percent. If we invest in Treas-
uries, the actuary says we must set aside $0.95; if we invest in equities, $0.91
will suffice.
Because the town wants to remain in business, that retiree is going to
receive $M/G next year. Each future retiree has a riskless promise worth
$0.95M/G. But the Mayor and actuary propose that the city and its pension
plan are long-term investors so they can afford to take risks that will average
out in the long run. Each Gen1 taxpayer then contributes $0.91 and the
plan buys the S&P index; the $0.91 is expected to grow to $1 next year. If
the assets are greater (or lesser) than $1, the taxes of Gen2 will be lesser (or
larger) by the difference.
Because, on average, the assets will be sufficient to pay the required $1,
members of Gen2 expect to pay the same tax that Gen1 must pay today.
Our actuary says that that is right and that Gen2 members can expect to
pay $0.91 next year. The actuarial definition of parity is met when each
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TABLE 6-1 Generational Balance Sheets
Sections Assets Liabilities
A: Gen1, Period1 Personal portfolioa $9.1 Payable now
B: Gen2, Period1 Personal portfolio:
$X S&P
Y T-bills
(due Period 2)
$0.91 expected
Risk of Gen1’s
S&P investment
C: Gen2, Period 1,
Analyzed
Personal portfolio:
$X S&P
Y T-bills
(due Period 2)
$.91 for Gen2 employees
1.00 for Gen1 retirees
−(0.91 S&P in plan as
of Period 1)
D: Gen2, Period 1,
Hedged
Personal portfolio:
$(X−0.91) S&P
(Y + 0.91) T bills
(due Period 2)
$0.91 for Gen2 employees
1.00 for Gen1 retirees
−(0.91 S&P in plan as
of Period 1)
E: Gen2, Period 2,
Projected
Personal portfolio $0.91 for Gen2 employees
$0.042105 for Gen1
retirees
generation expects to pay the same amount. But one member of Gen2, a
finance student, senses a problem. Whereas Gen1 is certain to pay $0.91,
Gen2 may pay more or less than $0.91 depending on how the S&P performs.
To show this, she develops a balance sheet for Gen1 (Table 6-1) and a
projected balance sheet for Gen2 (Table 6-1). The student reformulates the
risk in terms of exposure to the pension plan.
AQ: Pl.
check
footnote for
the note ’a’
is missing
Since the finance student has learned about hedging and arbitrage, she
has planned for her own future with a portfolio that includes just the amount
of risk and expected return that makes her comfortable (represented by an
exposure to $X of equities). She decides to hedge to eliminate any extra
risk thrust upon her by the pension plan. The hedge must be such that no
matter how the $0.91 set aside by Gen1 performs, she bears the risk that
she intended to take. Her S&P exposure is effectively $(X+ 0.91) while her
tolerance limits her to $X.5 In order to establish her hedge, she realizes
that she must sell $0.91 of S&P and invest the proceeds in T-bills (Table 6-1,
Section D). Now her total S&P exposure is $X as she intended. She projects
her balance sheet forward to Period 2 (Table 6-1, Section E) so that she may
compare to Gen1 in Period 1, where the negative $0.91 in S&P exposure
has cancelled out across the two sides of the balance sheet. The extra $0.91
she held in T-bills has grown by 5.2632 percent to $0.957895, which cancels
out all but $0.042105 of the $1 that must be paid to Gen1 retirees.
Comparing to Gen1’s balance sheet (Table 6-1, Section A) reveals that
Gen2 is worse off by $0.042105. Each future generation will be in the same
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position as Gen2. How may we interpret this $0.042105 difference between
Gen1 and later generations? Consider that the Gen1 public employees have
riskless promises worth $0.95G/M equivalent to $0.95 per taxpayer. Gen1
taxpayers have been told that they need pay only $0.91 to provide $0.95 of
riskless value, because the plan will take the equity risk. But our student has
taught us that she is the actual risk bearer: if the plan had invested risklessly
in T-bills to meet its riskless promise, Gen1 would have had to pay $0.95.
Gen2 would have suffered no imposed pension risk and Gen2 would have
had to pay $0.95 too.
Financial economics prescribes the use of a riskless discount rate for risk-
less liabilities, regardless of the actual investments. Had the actuary followed
this prescription (in violation of ASOP 27), Gen1 and Gen2 would each face
the same risk-hedged or risk-adjusted $0.95 cost. By paying only $0.91, Gen1
enjoys a risk-adjusted free lunch equal to $0.04 while subsequent genera-
tions have to pay $0.002105 more than the fair value of the benefits for their
governmental workers. In effect, the $0.04 Gen 1 shortfall grows at riskless
interest to $0.042105 (equals 0.04 times 1.052632). Gen2 pays the interest
and passes on the $0.04 shortfall to Gen3. This continues until the final
GenN is forced to pay $0.992105 representing the $0.95 needed to prefund
GenN retirees, the $0.04 ‘‘borrowed’’ by Gen1 and one year’s interest of
$0.002105.
One last way to assess this risk/wealth transfer across generations is to
recognize that Gen1 might have invested the full $0.95 value of its promise
in T-bills. A decision by the plan to sell those T-bills and invest in the S&P
would be recognized as a worthless Bader Swap and Gen1 would not have
received the $0.04 windfall contrived by the Mayor and made possible by
the ASOP 27 actuary.
In this example, the intergenerational transfers of risk have been conver-
ted to their certainty equivalents and reveal a $0.04 windfall for Gen1 that
makes all subsequent taxpayer generations losers. This seems like a small
‘‘evil,’’ so why should taxpayers worry? One reason is that initially it appeared
that the work of $1 in Treasuries could be matched by only $0.25 in equities.
In this latter example, we have $0.91 in equities doing the work of $0.95 in
Treasuries.
Consider, further, that this example assumed that retiree benefits are due
1 year after the civil service employee provides service to the taxpayers. In a
typical pension plan, however, the average worker may be 40+years old and
the average retirement promise is kept some 30 + years later. This means
that the discount process is more like the 30-year Bader Swap than it is like
the one-period pension example. When we consider taxpayer and worker
generations that are 30 years in length the intergenerational wealth transfer
is very large. Supposing a $1 promise 30 years in advance, the riskless cost
is $0.214639. Yet the actuary calculates a contribution requirement using
equities equal to $0.059053. As in the Bader Swap example, the actuary’s
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adherence to ASOP 27 enables an understatement of liabilities6 by about
75 percent. This amplifies the impact, by assuming that the plan might be
invested entirely in the S&P instead of in Treasuries. A more typical plan
might invest about half of its assets in bonds and half in equities, so ASOP
27 would lead to an understatement of liability values by about 50 percent.
Implications of Liability Mismeasurement
The process defined by ASOP 27 is considered unbiased by actuaries
because, on average, investment returns are neither under- nor overestima-
ted. Yet financial economists deem the risky discount of riskless promises to
be biased, because the resulting liabilities are systematically understated
compared to the market value of similar promises. Understatement of
the value of promises made to public employees leads to valuable risk
transfers between generations and inferior decision-making by taxpayer
representatives.
Three prominent examples of such poor decision-making are negotiated
wage/pension trade-offs, skim funds, and POBs.
Negotiated Wage/Pension Trade-offs
Because actuaries undervalue promised future retirement benefits, govern-
mental financial officers are prone to promise excessive retirement benefits
in exchange for insufficient wage give-ups at the bargaining table. A $1
retirement benefit to be paid 30 years hence may have a riskless discounted
value of $0.21, but it will be actuarially discounted to a value of $0.06. How
much of today’s wage should be given up by the employee in exchange for
that future benefit? As we have shown any value less than $0.21 represents a
real gain to the employee and any value greater than $0.06 creates an appar-
ent gain to today’s taxpayers. The $0.15 cost differential is always paid, by
future taxpayers, with interest.
A simple test of this proposition may be made by asking insurance compan-
ies to offer deferred annuities to cover the promises made. Pension actuaries
uniformly believe that insurance companies systematically and egregiously
overprice such contracts. Shareholders of insurance companies will not,
however, accept the risk of equity investment to fund fixed income annu-
ities without full market compensation for the risk.7 Since the full market
compensation for the risk is priced in expectation by a Bader Swap, the
insurance company shareholders must charge at least a riskless price for a
riskless promise.
Observe that the use of a near riskless rate of discount, independent of
the allocation of plan assets, would result in wage/benefit exchanges made
at the value of the benefits promised with almost no regard to how those
benefits are financed.
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Skim Funds
When public pension plans invest in risky assets, actual investment returns
may exceed the assumed returns. So-called ‘‘skim funds’’ exist in many
arenas to share the pension plans superior results with plan participants;
no similar sharing is levied on participants when risky returns turn out to be
inferior. Thus common skim funds designs look like financial call options.
Defined benefit pension plans implement a portion of the employment
contract under which employees accept reduced current cash contribu-
tions, in exchange for promises of conditional future retirement benefits.
Employees ‘‘own’’ the pension plan liabilities; the assets stand to provide
collateral for those liabilities. Risks taken with the assets are borne by
the sponsor (or its constituent taxpayers) in the hopes of reducing the
cash necessary to support the benefit promises. When the risks result in
losses, the sponsor is responsible for increased future contributions. The
justification for establishing skim funds frequently flows from a very differ-
ent understanding of the nature of pension assets and liabilities. This view
holds that plan assets represent employees’ accumulated deferred wages.
A view more consistent with the economic reality of defined contribution
plans.
For many years, public DB pension plans trailed their corporate brethren
in the proportion of their assets allocated to equities. Over the last two
decades, however, public plans increased their equity exposure to the point
where their equity exposure is, on average, not notably different from private
sector plans. The public sector began to emulate the private sector with the
intention of lowering the cost of benefit promises to the taxpayers who made
the promises. The fundamental actuarial error represented by ASOP 27’s
treatment of the valueless Bader Swap allows this seeming cost reduction to
be brought to taxpayers immediately.
If one were to view the taxpayers of all generations ensemble, it might
be possible to conclude that the expected cost reduction would be a fair
recompense for the added risks of equity investment. It would be incorrect,
however, to conclude that taxpayers have received a windfall because they
can execute a Bader Swap. Rather, taxpayers exchange wages for benefit
promises, and then they elect to engage in a Bader Swap. Since the benefits
promised remain unchanged, the risk inherent in the swap has not been
shared with plan participants.
Nonetheless, as public sector pension plans began to reduce their hold-
ings of bonds over time and increase their holdings of equities, negotiators
for the plan participants demanded that the rewards from equity investments
be shared between the participants and the taxpayers, taking advantage of
the fable that ties wages to plan assets. Municipal politicians and managers,
anxious to lower current costs by switching into equities, were willing to
share the ‘‘gains’’ with participants, despite the risk that was borne entirely
by taxpayers. The structure that emerged is the ‘‘skim fund,’’ which redirects
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some of the ‘‘excess’’ returns earned by the taxpayers’ acceptance of risk to
provide previously unscheduled benefit increases. The very same actuarial
error that encouraged equity investment, encouraged undervaluation of
promises made in lieu of wages, and transferred risk from today’s taxpayers
to tomorrow’s, is used to justify an asymmetric game in which today’s taxpay-
ers share rewards with tomorrow’s participants, once again to the detriment
of future taxpayers.
Observe that the use of a near riskless rate of discount, independent of the
allocation of plan assets, would reduce the financial managers’ incentive to
invest in equities. Then, faced with demands for shares of equity rewards, the
managers would be required to recognize the symmetric sharing of equity
risks as well.
Pension Obligation Bonds
A third implication deriving from the fundamental actuarial misvaluation of
the Bader Swap has prompted states to issue taxable POBs. To understand
the taxable POBs, it is useful to begin with an earlier period in which muni-
cipal taxpayers benefited from a tax arbitrage to the detriment of federal
taxpayers.
This began in the early 1980s, when some Wall Street public finance
specialists found a loophole in the federal tax system that allowed states
and municipalities to issue tax-exempt bonds, to cover past service con-
tributions to underfunded DB public pension plans. Without taking on
any net risk, the governmental entity could borrow at its below-Treasury
tax-exempt rate, and then it could place the proceeds in the pension
plan where it could be used to purchase comparable Treasury securit-
ies. This procedure provided a net gain to the local governments that
clearly came at the expense of the federal purse. In a short period
in the mid-1980s, billions of dollars of such transactions were under-
taken.
In order to deliver the advantages of this arbitrage to taxpayers imme-
diately, the pension plan actuary had to recognize that the pension plan
assets purchased with the borrowing proceeds could be used to reduce
the plan contributions by more than the debt service cost incurred by
the borrowed. Since there were true arbitrage gains available, actuar-
ies could establish methods and procedures to lower contribution costs
for the life of the borrowing, while remaining certain that the pen-
sion plan would be at least as well funded as it otherwise would have
been over the same period. In effect, the pure arbitrage met two use-
ful constraints: (i) the municipality’s total cash flow for debt service
and pension contributions could be reduced, and (ii) the plan would
always have assets at least as great as if the transaction had not been
undertaken.
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Within a few years, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) declared that any
future bond offerings used in such schemes would have to be taxable though
it grandfathered the outstanding pension bond issues as tax-exempt. For sev-
eral years following this ruling, Wall Street’s public finance departments did
not market or underwrite the issuance of pension bonds. But then managers
of public pension plans decided that holding Treasury bonds was inconsist-
ent with their long-term risk-return goals, and they undertook to redeploy
the assets. Using Bader Swaps, as a result, the reduction in the level of
contributions far exceeded the cost of debt service. The net reduction was
so important, in fact, that the tax-exempt status of the bonds was only the
smaller of the values added.8
Wall Street’s public finance departments soon saw a new opportunity to
market and underwrite pension bonds.
In the dozen or so years since the invention of this ‘‘actuarial arbitrage,’’
the volume of POBs has swelled. Only recently has the wisdom of POBs has
been called into question, as recently in Philadelphia (Davies, 2001).
To review how taxable POBs work, the municipality first borrows at its
taxable rate (which is greater than the comparable US Treasury borrowing
rate) and contributes the proceeds to the pension plan. Next the fund man-
agers invest the proceeds in diversified assets including equities. For the
sake of illustration, we assume that all of the proceeds are invested in the
S&P 500. The actuary then credits the fund with the expected return on
the S&P and reduces the required plan contributions by that amount. Gold
(2000) describes the taxable POB transaction by first assuming that the pro-
ceeds are invested in US Treasury securities that proportionally match the
cash flows of the new municipal indebtedness. Since the municipality’s bor-
rowing rate is higher than that of the Treasury, the net cash flows would be
unfavorable and the borrower would be a loser. In fact that is the economic
truth of the matter. Without significant risk modification, the transaction
is a loser for taxpayers. Nevertheless, the fund undertakes a Bader Swap,
thus achieving the goal of the POBs. The actuarially generated gain on the
Bader Swap generates more in apparent winnings than the first step really
lost. Once again, the loss is reflected in the increased risk borne by future
taxpayers and once again today’s taxpayers and politicians are the winners.
We observe that the use of a near-riskless rate of discount, independent of
the allocation of plan assets, would eliminate the ‘‘actuarial arbitrage’’ gains
from POBs, leaving nothing but the negative arbitrage that results from
borrowing at above Treasury rates to earn near riskless rates.
Conclusion
We have argued that currently accepted pension actuarial methods embed
a flawed understanding of the risk of equities and the improper valua-
tion of market-to-market swaps. The existing approach was developed as
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DB pension plans abandoned insurance companies and adopted trusteed
arrangements after Second World War. The flaw has been extended by the
accountants and by Congress when they incorporated actuarial principles
into their prescriptions.
Few are aware of the problem because recognizing the error requires
an integration of financial economics with actuarial science. Because the
existing standards favor today’s generation of managers, shareholders, tax-
payers, politicians, and actuaries, even those who do perceive the problem
are poorly motivated to correct it.
This problem has begun to be revealed, however. Consider the ‘‘legacy’’
pension obligations of the steel industry that received some attention in
March 2002, when President George W. Bush chose to protect that industry
with tariffs. A companion proposal, not adopted, would have had federal
taxpayers bail out the underfunded pension plans of failed steel companies.
Consider too the recent actions of the Boots Company (2001), a UK firm
elected to place its £2.3 billion plan in UK bonds matching the plan’s pro-
jected outflows. It chose to forego the illusory gains from a Bader Swap but
in doing so has had to explain its decision to shareholders, rating agencies,
and other interested parties. The firm has said that its motivation was to
reduce risks associated with mismatches between DB plan assets and plan
liabilities. It is interesting that Boots transaction coincided with the adoption
of Financial Reporting Standard 17 in the United Kingdom, a standard that
provides a market-based liability valuation model and may serve to expose
the risks of asset/liability mismatches. FRS 17 has been credited with increas-
ing accounting transparency, motivating a slight shift in asset allocation to
bonds from equity, and it has also been blamed for discouraging final aver-
age defined benefit plan formation and maintenance (Capleton and Cleary,
2002).
Unfortunately these are only small steps. The global accounting effort
to implement a ‘‘fair value’’ accounting model for financial instruments by
2005 will require accounting to learn the lessons of arbitrage and proper
risk-adjusted measurements. Nevertheless, the accounting project has thus
far elected to exempt pension and welfare plans from its purview. The pen-
sion actuarial community has begun its own research and education effort
designed to assess the implications of financial economics on the pension
actuarial model. We should therefore begin to see the fair value paradigm
influence securities analysts of pension plan finance.9
Notes
1Here we argue that the goal of intergenerational fairness may be served in
expectation but it is often poorly served in value.
2Note that after paying such an amount, the final payoff will be negative 9 percent
of the time, requiring a second payment at maturity. We assume that neither party
will default.
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3Bader had a $1 million obligation. Here we adjust to be consistent with our payoffs.
4These are sample means. Population means are 0.96 and 13.13.
5This equates $X in his personal portfolio plus the effect of having a liability of minus
$0.91 in S&P.
6Readers may note that the liabilities discussed here amount to benefits newly
earned. The corresponding liability might be called the ‘‘Unit Credit Normal Cost’’
or the ‘‘Service Cost.’’ These liability items may well approach the 30-year duration
implied by the text. Aggregate pension liabilities more typically show durations that
are about half as long.
7As shown by Bodie (1995), the price for equity risk is an increasing function of
the period of time over which the risk is taken. Actuarial myth holds that the risk of
equity ownership declines with time and that the equity risk premium is more truly a
reward for patience than it is compensation for risk. See also Lachance and Mitchell
(Chapter 8, this volume).
8The true value added, derived from below-Treasury borrowing to invest in Treasury
securities, was often far outweighed by the apparent value added by the Bader Swap.
9See Bader (2002) and Capleton and Cleary (2002).
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